A protocol between two parties Alice and Bob is zero-knowledge (from Alice’s point of view), if it does not leak any information to Bob. Zero-knowledge is a viagra naturel maca fundamental https://www.acheterviagrafr24.com/viagra-prix-en-pharmacie/ notion in cryptography and has important applications. For example, Alice can prove to Bob that she knows a secret key corresponding to a given public
https://www.acheterviagrafr24.com/achat-viagra-cialis-levitra/ key (e.g., for identifying herself to Bob) without leaking any information whatsoever about the secret key.
A zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties:
- Completeness: if the statement is true, the honest verifier (that is, one following the protocol properly) will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover.
- Soundness: if the statement viagra feminin forum uso is false, no cheating prover can convince the honest verifier that
it is true, except with female viagra some small probability.
- Zero-knowledge: if the cialis generique statement is true, no https://www.acheterviagrafr24.com/generic-viagra/ cheating verifier learns anything other than this fact. This is formalized by showing that every cheating verifier has somesimulator that, given only the statement to be proved (and no access to the prover), can produce a transcript that “looks like” an interaction between the honest prover and the cheating verifier.
The first two of these are properties of more general interactive proof systems. The third is what makes the proof zero-knowledge.
At CRG, researchers are currently working on finding feasible solutions for using zero knowledge proofs
for authentication and access control.